|
|
||
|
|
POST-CONFLICT Transnational
Publishers Inc Hardcover, 800-1025 pages, 2002 Review by K. L. Jamison |
|
|
In considering war with Iraq, or any power, some thought must be given to the aftermath. The editor has collected essays on the various problems in establishing justice during and after the war. Justice, however, is a tricky thing. The impulse is to demand a full trial and punishment for the tyrant. Given his own record, a trial and punishment is the last thing a tyrant would want. Some nations have adopted a "truth and reconciliation" system, in which parties confess, and are forgiven. However, given the historical example of ex-President Pinochet of Chile being charged by Spain for political-related crimes committed in Chile, after being given immunity by Chile, a tyrant may not want to risk another state taking jurisdiction, or a regime change. International tribunals have been another alternative, but have been criticized by the United States and others for the possibility of political abuse. Given these choices, a tyrant may see no alternative than to fight to the death. The editor collects essays discussing the problem of using military forces in a police role. The military is often regarded as a "blunt instrument" for the purpose of public order. However, in many societies, a blunt instrument, on the order of 9 or 90 mm, is just what is required to establish public order. One contributor recounts a division deployed to Somalia bringing a commentary on the Somali legal code. This would appear to be a rare and superfluous accessory; however division legal officers found that it reflected local concepts of legal procedure. Remnants of a legal system were found, but were hopelessly controlled by local warlords.There were budgetary and legal problems in providing logistics support sufficient to wean legal and police professionals from the warlords. The contributions range from practical advice on the use of translators to theoretical models of justice, to the occasionally bizarre. One contributor states that the policy of banning weapons from the streets of Mogadishu was successful by January, 1993. This should come as a surprise to the Rangers who fought the Black Hawk Down battle ten months later. Even more bizarre, the contributor was in Mogadishu at about the time of the battle and could not have escaped hearing about it. This is not the first time an advocate of gun control has confused policy with reality. Despite such occasional episodes, the work is a practical resource for commands involved in bringing justice out of an unjust situation. By providing multiple approaches to the problem, it provides important guidance for pre-conflict planning and essential guidance for commands thrust into an unjust society. |
||
